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Abstract: Government laws are not always consistent with the laws of supply and 
demand and when enacted have unintended consequences. Three real world 
examples provide illustrations of policy makers implementing policies that have 
unintended consequences. When households and firms look at prices when deciding 
what to buy and sell, they unknowingly take into account the social benefits and 
costs of their actions. As a result, prices guide these individual decision makers to 
reach outcomes that maximize the welfare of society as a whole. 
 
 
Ronald Regan once quipped that if economists invented the game of trivial 
pursuit it would have 1,000 questions and 3,000 answers.  This is hardly fair on 
the economics profession since most economists agree on most of the major 
propositions in economics. A study by Richard M. Alstron, J.R. Kearl and Michael 
B. Vaughan in the American economic Review (1992), and restated by Mankiew 
(2001), concluded that there is widespread agreement among economists on, for 
example, the impact of rent controls on the supply of housing, the effect on 
economic welfare of tariff and import quotas, the effect of budgets deficits on the 
macroeconomy, the effect of minimum wage laws on employment among young 
and unskilled workers and the preference of marketable pollution permits in 
controlling pollution over price ceilings. 
According to the Harvard economist Gregory Mankiew (2001), economists have 
two roles. As scientists they make observations and develop theories to explain 
those observed behaviours in the world around them. Secondly, they act as 
policy advisers using their theories to help governments make informed 
decisions on policy. Of course, economists do offer conflicting advice to policy 
makers because they will have different scientific judgments on alternative 
theories about how the world works. For Mankiew, having different scientific 
judgments is not something that is unique to the economics profession. After all, 
up to quite recently, meteorologists differed on the extent of global warming (or 
indeed if it was happening at all).  Different views prevailed because they held 
different scientific judgments on the evidence. Indeed, two hundred years ago 
astronomers were split on the question as to whether the sun or the earth was at 
the centre of the solar system. 
However, the problem of economic theory is that policy makers tend to ignore it. 
Three real world examples provide illustrations of policy makers implementing 
policies that did not consider economists advice on the unintended 
consequences of these policies. 
 
Rent Control 
Begg et al (2001) and Mankiew (2001) delineate the classic example of many 
countries imposing rent controls, which limit the rent landlords, can charge their 
tenants for rented accommodation. While the intended effect is laudable and 
designed to make accommodation more affordable for the poor, the unintended 
effects are quite the opposite. Initially the supply of rented accommodation is 
insensitive (or, to use the economic term, inelastic) to the new price, which is 
below the equilibrium rent.  This is because in the short run landlords cannot put 
their properties to alternative uses. In the short run therefore, the supply of 
rented accommodation is not reduced significantly below the quantity supplied 
at the market equilibrium rent. In the longer run the outcome is quite different.  
Landlords will tend to sell off their properties to purchasers who wish to buy 
their own home or perhaps use it as their own home. In addition, because 
landlords do not get the required return on their investments, properties run 
into disrepair. Indeed, Mankeiw cites one economist who described rent control 
as “the best way to destroy a city apart from bombing it.” 
The U.S. states of Massachusetts and California have abolished or scaled back 
their rent control laws but New York is one of the few that hasn’t changed.  In an 
article in the Boston Globe in April 1997 it was estimated that over two million 
people – over a quarter of the New York City’s population – live in apartments 
covered by rent control legislation. While the indented effect of rent control was 
to help the poor, the unintended effect was that those who occupied rent control 
apartments included movie stars, stockbrokers and lawyers, paying a fraction of 
the market equilibrium rent. This led the state of New York to pass a law that 
became known as the ‘Mia Farrow Law.’  This was reference to the actress who 
rented a ten-roomed apartment in Central Park for a fifth of the market rent. 
However, the law only lifted rent control for people earning more than $200,000 
per annum. The author concludes that, in essence, rent control is a law that few 
people and analysts (even liberal ones) support, apart from those, of course, who 
get to live in rent controlled apartments. 
 
Water Shortages 
Policy makers tend to respond to water shortages by regulation and controls. 
Economists favour a market-based solution. One of the unintended 
consequences of controls and regulation is that people tend to cheat and increase 
their consumption despite the controls. This leads to a form of ‘water policing’ 
where law enforcement agencies collect names of people suspected of ‘breaking 
the law.’ 
While immediate water shortages are caused by many factors, droughts for 
example, the real offender is the regulation that prevents the market forces of 
supply and demand for operating. This market solution, favoured by economists, 
is a better proposition than ‘water police’ spying on the poor consumer. 
Contrary to the view expressed by many regulators, water is not in fixed supply. 
The supply of water (like all resources) will change in response to economic 
conditions and to the market equilibrium price. For example, the Wall Street 
Journal noted that in developing countries the number of people with access to 
clean water in 1980 was 44%. In 1994 this had increased to 74% despite 
population growth. The reason: increased living standards brought about by 
rising real incomes that gave those countries the ability to supply drinking water. 
Furthermore, and invoking one of the first principles of economics that people 
respond to incentives, the supply of water will increase when people have the 
incentive to preserve their use of water.  By pricing water, the number of people 
wanting to sell (supply) water will exceed the number of people that will want to 
buy (demand) water. 
The data from around the world shows that when water prices increase by ten 
percent water use goes down by twelve percent.  If the role of policy makers is to 
increase the supply of water, then water must be treated as a commodity and the 
market forces of supply and demand will do the rest. 
 
Pollution 
Invoking Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market place, i.e. 
when households and firms look at prices when deciding what to buy and sell, 
they unknowingly take into account the social benefits and costs of their actions. 
As a result, prices guide these individual decision makers to reach outcomes that 
maximize the welfare of society as a whole. However, even Adam Smith 
acknowledged that markets will sometimes fail to allocate resources efficiently 
and that sometimes market outcomes are not efficient. The principle reason for 
this is what economists describe as ‘externalities.’ If all the costs and benefits of 
production are not included in the market price then the market outcome will be 
inefficient. For example, if during production, a pharmaceutical company emits 
pollution (a social cost) and if this social cost is not included along with all the 
explicit costs of production (raw materials, wages, etc), then the market prices 
charged will be too low and the output produced too high.  Regulators therefore 
must find a way of ‘internalizing’ (adding the social cost to the private explicit 
cost) this negative externality. 
A law that prohibits all pollution would only consider the marginal benefits that 
society would receive and would not consider the marginal cost. A law that 
prohibits all pollution would actually harm society. Indeed if such a law existed 
we would all die because individuals emit greenhouse gases in the form of CO2. 
An alternative, favoured by economists, is market based solutions. Market based 
solutions provide incentives to polluters to take into account the costs of their 
actions and by doing so move market outcomes to efficient outcomes. For 
example, suppose two factories, X and Y, each produces 200 tons of waste each 
year. The government wants factories to reduce this pollution to, say, 100 tons. 
There are three possible solutions to this – one regulatory and two market 
based. 
In the first instance, the government could command the factories to reduce their 
emissions to 100 tons per annum. However, this may not be the most efficient 
way to solve the problem because one company, X, could possibly reduce their 
pollution at a lower cost than the other company, Y. Forcing both companies to 
reduce emissions to the same level may lead to the overall costs being greater 
than the benefits. 
An alternative to regulation is taxation. Under regulation there is no incentive to 
reduce pollution beyond the stated level. Each company will simply reduce their 
emissions to the stated amount. Bt taxing pollution an incentive is created to 
lower pollution beyond the stated amount. By taxing each ton of pollution, 
companies will have the incentive to develop alternative cleaner technologies 
and therefore, possibly, reducing their tax liabilities to zero. 
A second market-based approach is tradable pollution permits. This is a 
mechanism to use property rights and the market to reduce pollution back to an 
efficient level. Any polluter that cuts its pollution below the regulated amount 
will obtain an emissions reduction credit and this can be sold to another 
company who wants to pollute above their level. Suppose that, in our example, 
company X wants to increase its pollution by 100 tons and that company Y 
agrees to reduce its emissions by 100 tons if factory X agrees to pay it, say, €1m. 
In other words the market price of this pollution permit is €1m. Factories that 
find it very costly to reduce pollution now have an incentive to research new, 
cleaner technologies and therefore spend less on permits. This has the same 
outcome as the taxation proposal. The consequence is that regulators 
(governments) do not have to find out which factories are most efficient in 
reducing pollution – the market forces of supply and demand does this. 
 
Conclusion 
Markets are a very efficient way of allocating the world’s scarce resources. The 
laws of supply and demand ensure that efficient outcomes are usually 
guaranteed. It is also accepted that market outcomes are sometimes inefficient 
because of the existence of externalities. How these externalities are internalized 
to improve market efficiency is the subject of much debate. The laws passed by 
governments with the intended effect of improving market efficiency and equity 
are not always in tune with the laws of supply and demand. 
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